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The Foxhole Philosopher

A forum for thoughtful discussion of practical issues facing the military, civil, and political world today. None of the Opinions expressed here are a reflection of United States, her Military, or any other organization other than those of the author.

Name:
Location: Iraq

4.21.2006

Privates

While I respect CSM Pendry and his opinion as expressed in his opinion piece, Generals, I must disagree with him on one critical point. He states:

What these men are doing is more damaging to Soldier morale and the war effort than anything the likes of Kerry or Fonda ever mustered during Vietnam.

My fundamental disagreement stems not from the comparison to Sen. Kerry and Jane Fonda, although I disagree with that as well, but instead from the assertion that it poses a threat at all to the morale of soldiers.

To follow CSM Pendry’s example there are two types of privates in the army. The first type is the one that is portrayed in the media the most, but is actually less common. They are the simpletons, the ones who could not succeed academically, or perhaps just wanted to make things go boom. These soldiers do exist. They do not care what some general, active or retired says, and I would be willing to bet that they do not know what these generals said.

The second type of soldier is actually more common, but not viewed as genuine by the media. These soldiers are relatively well educated, many of whom have some college or have graduated college altogether. We have a soldier who has a PhD and is now a corporal in the U.S. Army. This is the type of soldier that eventually goes on to become either officers or non-commissioned officers. They may know what is going on with the “General’s Revolt” they either do not care, much like the privates, or realize that this is something in the political realm. They understand politics, at least enough to not get swept away by it.

In the end, soldiers are far more concerned about mundane things than they are about politics and Generals. Even I do not really much care about what a bunch of retired generals have to say, or who is the secretary of defense. In reality, most soldiers just care about going home as soon as possible, and all they really want is for people to think that they did a good thing. They are doing a good thing too. I hope you know that.

4.17.2006

Cultural Myopia

In preparing to come to Iraq, I and my fellow soldiers underwent extensive "culteral awareness" training. While this may have raised 'awareness' I don't think that many people are capable of seeing through the lense of another culture. It is sort of like the question "Do I percieve the same color that you percieve when I say blue, or if I could see through you eyes, would the world look different than it does through mine." Culture is the framework through which we judge everything. The only people that I have seen who are even moderately successful at understanding other cultures are also eccentric. That is to say the only people who can somewhat understand other cultures are the people who never really accepted the rules of their own culture.

4.16.2006

Rummy's Woes, and the Military Establishment

What with all the brouhaha surrounding the "coup de Rummy" I thought I would weigh in with a little perspective of military organization, and why you seldom hear dissent from the military. Famously, and unconfirmedly every person is only seven steps away from any other person. Why the steps are more numerous, in the military they are more concrete from the lowest ranking officer to the halls of policy. Even a platoon leader is only seven direct steps from the Secretary of the Army, and nine direct steps from the President is he goes directly through his chain of command.

Being in such a heirarchical system may seem restrictive but it is also very empowering. Every officer in the Army knows exactly whom he must convince to bring about a policy change. Now truthfully, most officers will never be concered about anything other than the tactical level. It is only as generals that strategic decisions get made. Those generals do rely upon the input of tactical level commanders to develop the situation. As a result, every military policy is the sum total of the input of basically every officer, directly or indirectly

However, when general officers leave the military, they suddenly loose all of their explicit power. To be sure the connections that they maintain and their knowledge gives them considerable influence. However they are deprived of direct and regular input.

A very wise an experienced politician once sat me down in the legislative chamber and told me, "The press is the weapon of the weak. If you have power you will use it to get what you want, if you don't you go to the press." This is never more true than in the military. Those who are still in power still have the influence, and they use it. Some of them may feel like they are not listened to and resign rather than continue with a policy that they disagree with, but other than that, most go along, until something better comes along. Occaisionally, some will have a chance to reassert their influence, to a diminished degree through the press. This is why you don't hear opposition from generals much, and occaisionally from retired generals.